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The LEGAL SYSTEM'S
use of

EPIDEMIOLOGY
by Arthur H. Bryant and Alexander A. Reinert

B

oth law and science are truthseeking endeavors. In at least
one respect, lawyers and scientists are like Agent Mulder on the
X-Files: we believe that the truth is
out there and our goal is to find it.
This article is devoted to exploring
and improving the means by which
law relies on scientific disciplines,
particularly epidemiology, to ascertain the truth.
While there are obvious differences
between the processes used to search
for truth in the scientific and legal
arenas, the importance of science in
the law is difficult to overstate. The
law's interest in and reliance on science had been growing since well
before the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Brown v. Board of Education (1954),
made use of social science research to
reject the notion that racially separate
education was really equal. Now, in
courtrooms throughout the country,
judges and juries look every day at scientific evidence to determine the
truth (and to decide who wins and
loses) in a wide array of contexts,
including toxic tort, employment discrimination, environmental protec-
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tion, products liability, civil rights,
and criminal cases.
Unfortunately, although science
and the law have similar truth-seeking goals, our judicial system has suffered from the failure to apply
accurately scientific knowledge in the
courtroom.
Epidemiology
(the
branch of medicine dealing with the
incidence and prevalence of disease
in large populations) is a critical scientific discipline that has been misused by the law in the past 25 years.
Some of this misuse is not the outcome of particular legal rulesJudges,
lawyers, or witnesses who do not adequately understand epidemiology
simply misapply it. Regretfully, however, judges and policy makers also
have established systemic rules that
give epidemiological studies either
more or less weight than scientists
would give them. As a result, the law
is being taken further from the truth.
This article reviews six ways in
which some courts are misusing epidemiological studies. These errors
often preclude courts (and especially
juries) from considering evidence
that scientists (and especially epi-
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demiologists) would readily consider. And, perhaps most galling, the
justification given by judges for precluding reliance upon this expert
testimony is that the testimony is not
really "scientific." On this basis, the
views of highly-accomplished scientists have been barred from the
courts.' This article explains and
offers some reasons for the errors,
contends that epidemiological studies should be given the same weight
and consideration in the legal arena
that they are given in the scientific

This article is an abridged version of a presentation delivered at "From Epidemiology to Policy: A
Symposium on the Translation of Epidemiologic
Evidence into Public Health Policy" on July 19,
1998. The symposium wasjointlysponsored by the
Center for Epidemiology and Policy and the Risk
Sciences and Public Policy Institute ofJo hns Hopkins School of Public Health and th e American
College of Preventive Medicine. A version of this
paper was previously published•in the American
Journal of Epidemiology. Some citations have
been updated to reflect legal developments since
the presentation was delivered and since the
American Journal of Epidemiology paper was
published, although not all citations are included
h ere. For a copy of the original paper, a copy of
this article that includes all footnotes, or the
American J ournal of Epidemiology article, please
contact Arthur Bryant at Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, Ordway Building, One Kaiser Plaza, Suite
275, Oakland, CA 94612-3684.
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arena, and, finally, suggests several
ways that epidemiologists, lawyers,
judges, and other policy makers can
work together toward this goal.

Isolated misuse
Jurors and judges in state and federal courts increasingly are called
upon to evaluate the strength of a
litigant's case based in part upon
the presentation of epidemiological
studies. Judges, whether making the
initial determination of admissibility or adjudicating post-trial sufficiency of the evidence motions,
must critically consider the nature
of the evidence presented, including the role that epidemiology plays
in informing scientific testimony.
Thus, an initial problem for our justice system is the lack of scientific
training of most federal and state
judges. This lack of training makes
judges vulnerable to misunderstanding and manipulation.
We briefly discuss here some examples of the difficulty judges have faced
in correctly understanding concepts
in epidemiology. Some of the examples reveal a basic unfamiliarity with
general scientific principles, but are
probably harmless. Take, for example, courts that have referred to
"Koch's Postulates" as a means of evaluating epidemiological studies. 2 What
these courts have in mind is not
Koch's Postulates, but a modified version of Hill's suggestions for analyzing
epidemiological studies. 3 Fortunately,
these courts have been right on the
fundamentals, because Hill's criteria
for evaluating epidemiological studies
are generally accepted in the scientific community, and the error is
understandable in part, given that the
first edition of the Federal Judicial
Center's Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, upon which many courts
rely, also misidentified Hill's criteria
as Koch's Postulates. 4
In some cases, however, the mistakes made by courts in evaluating
epidemiologic evidence carry more
substantive consequences. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, in Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (1989), considering
the sufficiency of scientific evidence

presented in a case involving an allegation that Bendectin caused birth
defects, illustrated the difficulty some
courts have understanding the
proper interpretive weight to give
confidence intervals.
First, the court asserted that the
use of confidence intervals eliminated any need to analyze a particular study for recall bias or
confounding. This is plainly false,
because a confidence intervalwhich simply represents the range of
values that, with a specified degree of
certainty, is likely to contain the true
measure of association between the
disease and the proposed cause-has
no connection to recall bias or confounding. In addition, the court
stated that if a confidence interval
included 1.0 in its range of possible
values, then "no statistically significant conclusions could be drawn"
from a study. 5 This treatment of confidence intervals as interchangeable
with "significance testing"-a proposition for which Brock has been cited
by numerous courts-is a common
misunderstanding, and will be discussed in detail in the section on
structural misuse of epidemiology.
Similar examples abound. In a district court case, a federal judge
starkly demonstrated the difficulty
that some courts have with the basic
statistical method of hypothesis testing. After noting that accepted p-values for hypothesis testing included
"5%" and "l %," the court equated
those percentiles with the numerical
values 0.5 and 0.1, respectively,
instead of the correct values of 0.05
and 0.01. 6 Due to this IO-fold error,
the court misapplied its own standards in evaluating the reliability of
a particular study of the relationship
between thyroiditis and low level
radiation. These examples, in isolation, are of minimal concern compared to the structural problems
detailed below. Isolated mistakes,
however, gain power when they are
translated into general rules of
application. Courts and commentators, therefore, should vigilantly
identify and correct mistakes before
they are transformed into general
legal principles.
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Structural misuse
More disturbing than isolated mistakes is the misuse of epidemiology
that is certain of repetition because
of its incorporation into general legal
rules for evaluation of scientific evidence. Some of these rules have been
imposed in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and
abandoning the longstanding Frye
test of admissibility of expert testimony. While the Frye test focused on
whether an expert's views were "generally accepted" in the scientific community, Daubert ushered in a
non-exclusive multi-factored inquiry
into the expert's methodology that
was thought, at the time, to be more
flexible in application. Many federal
courts, however, have applied Daubert
to restrict scientific testimony in a
way that profoundly departs from scientific principles.
This article reviews six specific types
of structural errors made by courts
when interpreting epidemiological
evidence: (1) the insistence by some
courts that "positive human epidemiological studies are always required" to
support an opinion that a substance
causes a particular adverse health outcome; (2) the conclusion by some
courts that the absence of any "positive" epidemiological study trumps

1. Hall v. Baxter H ealthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp.
1387 (D. Or. 1996) (excluding testimony of Dr.
Shanna Swann); Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chemical
Corp. , 921 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (excluding
testimony of New York University Medical School
Professor Harry Demopoulos); Wade-Greaux v.
Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1482
(D. V.I.) (excluding testimony of Dr. Stuart Newman, a "highly regarded bench scientist"), aff'd 46
F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).
2. E.g. Berry v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 709 So.
2d 552, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
3. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Assodation
or Causation? 58 PROC. R. Soc. MED. 295 (1965).
4. Bailey, Gordis, & Greene, Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 161 (Washington , DC: Federal Judicial
Center, 1994). Although the FederalJudicial Center's second edition of the Reference Manual on Sd-

entific Evidence corrected this error, some courts

have repeated the Berry court's mistake. See Miller
v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2326, 2002 WL 221410, at
*4 (D. Kan. Feb. 7, 2002).
5. Brock, 874 F.2d at 312.
6. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation,

No. CY-91-3015-AAM, 1998 WL 775340, at *23
(E.D . Wash. Aug. 21, 1998), rev 'd on other grounds,
292 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2002).

other nonepidemiological evidence
supporting causation; (3) the decision
by some courts to prohibit expert testimony in support of causation unless
it is based on epidemiological studies
that report a doubling of risk associated with exposure; (4) the insistence
by some courts that an expert's views
can't be considered unless they have
been published in peer review publications; (5) the requirement that
expert testimony be based only on
studies that meet an arbitrary test of
"statistical significance"; and (6) the
exclusion of expert testimony based
on studies with a confidence interval
that includes 1.0.
Some courts exclude expert testimony if it is not based on "positive"
epidemiological studies. One of the
most restrictive and scientifically
inadequate rules adopted by some
courts is that an expert must rely on
epidemiological studies in order to
come to a "scientifically reliable " conclusion that a particular exposure
caused a particular outcome. For
example, some courts have stated
arbitrarily that "disinterested and
impartial experts in teratology"
require "two high quality epidemiological studies" to conclude that a
substance is a teratogen (that is, that
it causes birth abnormalities). 7 Some
courts have limited this rule to cases
involving Bendectin, in which the
7. DePyper v. Navarro, No. 83-303467-NM, 1995
WL 788828, at *30 (M ich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27, 1995).
8. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 11 59
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
9. Brock, 874 F.2d at 3 11.
10. Id. at 313.
11. Raynor v. Merrell Pharmaceuticals, In c., I 04
F.3d 137 1, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
12. Meister v. Medical Engi.neering Corp., 267 F.3d
1123, 11 32 (D .C. Ci r. 2001); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, IOI F.3d 129, 138-139 (D.C. Ci r. 1996).
13. Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d
1300 (I Ith Cir. 1999).
14. A/kn v. Pennsylvania Engi.nee,ing Corp., 102
F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996); E.l. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co. v. Castillo, 748 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App.
I 998); Nelson v. American Sterilizer Company, 566
N.W.2d 67 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
15. Thomas v. HoJJman-LaRoche, Inc., 731 F.
Supp. 224 (N.D. Miss. 1989).
16. In re "Agent Orange " Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Weinstein,
DJ.) .
17. Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp.
1545, 1554 (D. Colo. 1990).
18. Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 972 F.2d
304,308 (10th Cir. 1992) .

mass of epidemiologic evidence
reflects no association between the
drug and the outcome in question. 8
The Fifth Circuit in Brock, for
instance, noted that because there is
no consensus that Bendectin is teratogenic, the "most useful and conclusive type of evidence in a case such
as this" rests on e pidemiology. 9
According to the court, the lack of
"statistically significant" epidemiological proof that Bendectin causes limb
reduction defects was "fatal" to the
plaintiffs' case.'0 While the court was
careful to say that such proof was not
necessary in all toxic tort cases, the
import of the decision is that epide miology is necessary when the only
other evidence takes the form of animal studies. For, according to the
appellate court, a scientist who testifies to an opinion based on in vitro
and in vivo animal studies unconfirmed by epidemiology engages in
"speculation." Thus, the court held
that no reasonable jury, based on
such evidence, could conclude that
Bendectin caused limb reduction
defects.
Arguably, the Bendectin cases
occupy a special place in causation
jurisprudence because numerous epidemiological studies have failed to
uncover an association between the
drug and birth defects. For instance,
in a Bendectin case, while the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia made the broad assertion
that the "only way" to extrapolate data
from animals to humans was to conduct human experiments or to use
epidemiology, it noted that this was
especially true where sound epidemiological studies support a conclusion
opposite that of nonepidemiological
ones.''
The D. C. Circuit recently has
emphasized that the rules it developed in the Bendectin litigation can
be limited to those cases and others
in which there is overwhelming epidemiologic evidence against finding
causation. 12 This position is echoed
by the Eleventh Circuit. '3 The rules
announced in the Bendectin litigation have, however, been influential
in other toxic tort cases. 14 This is true
even in cases where, unlike Ben-

dectin, there is simply a Jack of any
epidemiologic evidence.
For example, the categorical rule
from Brock was applied in a suit seeking damages for alleged neurotoxic
effects of accutane to support the
proposition that, without some epidemiological study or statistical basis,
an expert's opinion on causation is
simply conjecture. 15 And a wellrespected federal district court, commenting on evidence presented in
the Agent
Orange
litigation,
described epidemiological studies as
"the only useful studies having any
bearing on causation."16
As if to underscore the point, a district court judge in Colorado
extended the requirement for epidemiology one step further, holding
that, in mass exposure cases, the
plaintiffs were legally required to submit epidemiologic evidence. 17 This
was the judge's position despite the
fact that the plaintiffs' experts had
testified that the exposed community
in this case (where plaintiffs alleged
contamination of their water supply
by hydrazines, trichloroethene, and
n-nitrosodimethylamine) was too
small to perform an epidemiological
study. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision
to grant summary judgment for the
defendant, but balked at adopting
the lower court's "dicta" that a supporting epidemiological study was
required for any mass exposure
case. 18
This judicial emphasis on the
essential role of epidemiology in
establishing medical causation is not
reflected in traditional scientific
prac tice. While epidemiology is recognized as a powerful and useful tool
in assessing etiologic relationships,
many causal associations have been
established in the absence of epidemiological proof. In some of these
cases, the outcome may be considered a "signature" of the exposure,
and pathologic studies, case reports,
and animal studies were sufficient to
convince the medical community of a
causal relationship (e.g., asbestos with
asbestosis and mesothelioma) .
Sometimes there is no "signature
disease," but scientific evidence aside
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from epidemiology is sufficient to
convince physicians that a causal relationship exists.
For example,
asbestos' relationship with lung cancer was first noted by leading pathologists,
to
be
supported
by
epidemiologists about a decade
later. 19 And the teratogenic effect of
thalidomide was discovered through
observant clinicians, not through epidemiology.20 Indeed, most teratogens
"were initially identified in case
reports and clinical studies[,] . . .
because teratogenic exposures typically produce qualitatively distinct
patterns of congenital anomalies in
affected children. "21
Thus, when courts insist that "reliable" teratologists will not conclude
that a particular substance causes
birth defects without support from
epidemiology, they speak against the
weight of history. It is one thing for
courts to recognize the insight that
epidemiology offers scientists in
assessing causation; it is quite
another to impose criteria that are
not followed by the medical and scientific community, thereby giving
epidemiology greater weight in
assessing legal causation than it is
given by scientists.
Some courts insist that nonepidemiological evidence should play little or no role in an expert's opinion
regarding causation. A corollary of
requiring epidemiological studies to
prove causation is the judiciallyinvented rule that, where epidemiological studies are inconclusive, other
sources of evidence supporting causation cannot reasonably be relied
upon by expert witnesses or jurors to
find causation. Thus, in the presence
of inconclusive or nonexistent epidemiological studies, some courts
refuse to allow an expert to testify
solely on the basis of animal studies,22
and some judges rule that no reasonable juror could believe that substance X caused outcome Y in an
individual, where the expert opinion
in support of causation is based on
studies other than epidemiology.
Some courts may discount animal
studies because the dosage levels are
not analogous to human doses. 23 Others specifically note that expert evi-

dence cannot prove causation wher:i,
relying on chemical structure activity
analysis, in vitro studies, and in vivo
studies, in the face of an "overwhelming body of contradictory epidemiological evidence. "2• Courts will
fault scientists for relying on such evidence even where a substance has
been classified as a carcinogen by regulatory agencies. 25
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit limited non-epidemiologic evidence more expansively
when it stated that studies of analogous chemical structures, as well as in
vivo and in vitro animal studies, "do
not have the capability of proving causation in human beings in the
absence of any confirmatory epidemiological data. "26 Thus, according to
the First Circuit, even where there is
no epidemiologic evidence at all,
other sources of data traditionally
relied upon by scientists are not reliable. This position was echoed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania when
it addressed the scientific methodology of expert witnesses in Bendectin
litigation. 27 The Pennsylvania court,
accepting the defendant's argument,
held that the methodology used to
assess teratogenicity must rely on epidemiology demonstrating a strong
association, while animal studies and
chemical analyses could only confirm,
not prove, a causal association. Other
courts have taken similar positions. 28
While most of the vitriol directed
towards non-epidemiological studies
has been reserved for animal studies,
clinically-based case studies also have
been identified as particularly unreliable by courts. In a case involving silicone breast implants, a district court
stated that "case reports and case
studies are universally regarded as an
insufficient scientific basis for a conclusion regarding causation because
case reports lack controls .... Therefore, these cannot be the basis of an
opinion based on scientific knowledge under Daubert. "29 Many other
courts have taken similar positions. 30
Statements like this take no
account of how there was any understanding of cause and effect prior to
the first large scale epidemiological
studies of the I 950s. As we have
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noted, for substances such as asbestos
or thalidomide, causal associations
were made in the absence of epidemiological studies. All areas of scientific discipline may be relevant to
etiologic conclusions: clinical observations, animal studies, toxicologic
studies, and chemical analysis. In
some cases, epidemiology is the most
useful tool for evaluating cause-effect
relationships, but not in every case.
Some courts' insistence that epidemiological studies trump other forms of
scientific evidence is simply contrary
to scientific practice.
Some courts prohibit expert testimony in support of causation unless
it is based upon epidemiological data
that show a doubling of risk associated with exposure to the alleged
cause of disease. The two misuses of
epidemiology
discussed
above
involve courts excluding evidence
that scientists consider relevant to
evaluating causal relationships by giving more weight to epidemiological
19. Hueper, OCCU PATIONAL TUMORS AND ALLIED
DISEASES (Springfield, IL: C. C. Thomas, 1942) ;
Hueper, Cancer in its Relation to Occupation and
Environment, 25 BULL. AM. Soc. CONTROL CANCER
63--69 (1943); Doll , Mortality from Lung Cancer in
Asbestos Workers, 2 BR. J. IND. MED. 81-86 ( 1955).
20. Sherman & Strauss, Thalidomide: a Twentyfive Year Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. j.
458-466 (1986).
21. Friedman & Politka, TERATOGENIC EFFECTS
OF DRUGS: A REsoURCE FOR CLINICtANS vii (Baltimore, MD:Johns H opkins University Press, 2000).
22. See generally Berger, Upsetting the Balance
Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme
Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 303--304
(2001) (discussing problem with rejecting animal
studies and over relying on epidemiological studies).
23. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 729 (Tex. 1997).
24. Richardson '7y Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. , 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
25. Allen, 102 F.3d at 198.
26. Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830
F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987).
27. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 705
A.2d 1314 (Pa. 1997).
28. Siharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. , 131
F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1366-1367 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ;
Castillo, 748 So.2d at 1120; Nelson, 566 N.W.2d at
674-675.
29. Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1411.
30. Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1361-1362; Nelson v. American Home Products Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d
954,969 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Muuey, 921 F. Supp. at
519; Casey v. Ohio Medical Products, 877 F. Supp.
1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d
at 199. But see, e.g., Silivanch v. Cekbrity Cruises, Inc.,
171 F. Supp. 2d 241 , 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (case
reports "are plainly relevant to an expert's opinion as to whether a given risk factor is generally
associated with an injury") .

studies then do scientists. There is,
however, another variation on the
theme. Courts also exclude epidemiologic evidence that scientists value
by giving some epidemiological studies less weight than do sci en tis ts.
Thus, some courts insist that, to be
heard by a jury, expert opinions must
be based on epidemiological studies
that meet artificial, non-scientific
standards of "scientific validity." Pe rhaps the most dangerous of these
court-created criteria is the requirement that any epidemiological study
relied on to support causation
demonstrate an association betwee n
an exposure and disease of more
than twice the background incidence
of disease. In essence, these courts
have conflated the magnitude or
strength of association revealed in a
population-based study with the probability that a substance has caused disease in a particular individual." By
imposing this requirement, courts
appear to have been directly influenced by scientists who resurrected
the concept of "probability of association" in an attempt to rationalize
compensation for radiation-induced
cancers. 32 The derivation of individual "probabilities" of causation from
population-base d data has b een

roundly criticized by e pidemiologists.33 Yet it retains force in the
courts, and informs the rule adopted
by some judges that expert testimony
is inadmissible unless it relies on an
epidemiological study with a relative
risk (or odds ratio) of 2.0 or more.
Examples of this misapplication of
probability-based concepts abound in
toxic to rt cases, from those involving
intrauterine devices, per chloroethylene exposure, to silicone breas t
implants. One court, along wi.t h
imposing this arbitrary requirement
on a testifying expert, also rej ected
the expert's reliance on a study that
did find a relative risk higher than
2.0, because in the court's view, a
larger sample size was required than
the 445 women studied. 34
In 1995, a panel of th e Ninth Circuit went perhaps the farthest of
courts in imposing unscientific standards on expert evidence, holding
not just that a witness must rely on an
epidemiological study with a relative
risk greater than two, but that a study
showing less than a relative risk of
two "may suggest teratogenicity" but
"actually tends to disprove legal causation."'" Building on the Ninth Circuit's statements, a federal district
court judge h eld that plaintiffs had to

31. E.g. , Magistini v. One H our Martinizing Dry
Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 591 (D.NJ. 2002)
( citing Federal Judicial Center's 2000 Reference
Guide on Epidemiology for proposition that "the
threshold for concluding that an agent was more
likely than not the cause of an individual's disease is
a relative risk greater than 2.0") (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks om itted); but see
e.g., Miller, 2002 WL 22 14 10, al *12 (rejecting as
"arbitrary" the requirement that relative risk be
greater than 2.0).
32. Council on Scientific Affairs, Radioepidemi<>logical Tables, 257 J .A.M.A. 806-809 ( 1987).
33. Greenland & Robins, Conceptual Problems in
the Definition and Interpretation of Attributable Fractions, 128AM. J. EP1. 11 85-1197 ( 1988) .
34. Kelury v. American Heyer-Schulte Carp., 957 F.
Supp. 873, 878, 880 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
35. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, In c.,
43 F.3d 1311 , 1321 (9th Cir. 1995).
36. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation,
1998 WL 775340, al *13, rev'd, 292 F.3d 11 24 (9'"
Cir. 2002).
37. Pozefsky v. Baxter H ealthcare Corp., No. 92 Civ.
0314, 2001 WL 967608, *3 (N .D.N.Y. Aug. 16,
200 I ) ; Siharath, 13 l F. Supp. 2d at 1356; In re Breast
Implant Litigation, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225-1 227
(D . Colo. 1998) .
38. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671,
676 (NJ. App. Div. 1991).
39. Greenland and Ro bins, supra n. 33, at 1185.
"Relative risk" is calculated by dividing the incidence rate of an illness or o utcome in an exposed

population by the incidence rate of that illness or
outcome in a general or presumably unexposed
population. For example, if an illn ess occurs in 5
out of 1,000 people in the general population but
20 out of 1,000 in the exposed population, the relative risk is .02/ .005 = 4.0. A relative risk of 2
would reflect an exposed incidence rate twice as
large as a baseline incidence rate. Closely related
to relative risk is the "attributable risk," which provides an estimate of the "excess cases" attributable
to exposure. Attributable risk is calculated by taking th e difference between the incidence rate in
the exposed group and the incidence rate in an
unexposed but presumably similar group and
dividing that difference by the incidence rate in
the exposed group. In the example given above,
the attributable risk would be (.02-.005) / .02 = .75.
That figure implies that three-<juarters of the
cases in the exposed population are statistically
attributable to exposure . These are the "excess
cases," in excess of the number that would be
expected to occur in the absence of exposure to
the putative cause. But it is crucial to keep in
mind two matters: First, these probability analyses
operate at the population level and do not automatically apply to the individual case; and second,
even at the population level, these kinds of calculatio ns presume perfect epidemiological studies,
unrealistically free of bias or error and with perfect matching of the exposed and unexposed
groups on all factors except exposure. Judgment
is always necessary in assigning weight to epidemiological evidence, whether in scie nce or in law.

submit epidemiological studies showing a two-fold increase in risk to proceed in the massive Hanford Nuclear
Reservation Litigation .36 In 2002, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's d ecision, cabining its previous
1995 decision to circumstances
where the re is no o ther evidence to
support causation other than epide miology. Between 1995 and 2002,
however, all district courts in the
Ninth Circuit were required to follow
the 1995 decision-and making matters worse, m any district courts outside
of the
Ninth
Circuit's
jurisdiction relied on that court's
1995 decision to impose the ir own
similar requirements. 37
In theory, the requirement that
any epidemiological study presented
to a jury report a two-fold magnitude
of association might make sense if
the plaintiffs rely solely on epidemiology to prove causation. In such a
case, there would not be sufficient
evidence to conclude that the specified exposure more likely than not
caused the disease in the plaintiff. If,
however, as is almost always the case,
the plaintiffs also introduce other evidence to prove causation-such as
pathology, animal experimentation,
molecular modeling, or case studies-then requiring the epidemiological studies relied on by the plaintiffs
to show a relative risk or odds ratio of
greater than 2.0 is without support.
An appeals court in New Jersey got it
right when it stated that this requireme nt "makes little sense, scientifically
or legally. "36
There are also more subtle problems with the thinking evinced by the
courts above, all of which have been
astutely observed by epidemiologists.
To begin with, some studies may only
measure an increased incidence in
the subset of cases which would not
have occurred had there been no
exposure (excess cases) and may
ignore other cases in which exposure
played a role in the e tiology of the
disease (etiologic cases). 39
For instance, if an individual develops a disease five years earlier than
she would have had she not been
exposed to a certain substance, she
would not be considered an excess
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case, but she would be considered an
etiologic case. From the law's perspective (and science's) the fraction
of all etiologic cases attributable to
exposure is significant, not just the
fraction of excess cases associated
with exposure. This is because developing a serious disease at age 45
instead of age 50 will likely have an
impact on overall life expectancy. If a
court imposes a requirement that an
injured plaintiff may only recover if
she can prove that the probability
that her disease was induced by exposure exceeds 50 percent, use of an
excess fraction (a fraction that only
represents the percentage of excess
cases attributable to exposure) would
disadvantage the plaintiff.
Courts often demonstrate their
failure to understand the significance
of etiologic cases by focusing only on
excess cases. For instance , the
Supreme Court of Texas, in Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner (1992),
stated that "there is a rational basis
for relating the requirement that
there be more than a 'doubling of
the risk' to ... the more likely than
not burden of proof." 40 The court
hypothesized a population in which a
condition "naturally" occurs in six
out of every 1,000 people. Then the
court imagined that, of 1,000 people
taking a drug, nine contracted the
disease. While acknowledging that
the model is an "oversimplification,"
the court baldly stated that it is not
"more likely than not" that the drug
caused any one incidence of disease.
The Havner court did not even consider the possibility that, while there
were only three excess cases in the
population exposed to the hypothetical drug, the other six cases might
have developed disease five years earlier because of exposure to the drug.
The fact that an exposure causes susceptible individuals to develop disease earlier than they would have
absent exposure is both legally and
medically significant.
Moreover, courts that insist on a
two-fold magnitude of association
between determinant and disease are
ignoring the difficulty of estimating
individual risk from population-based
data. While population-based data

are useful in evaluating issues of gen- .
era! causation in a toxic tort case, they
must be carefully applied to the question of specific causation. The basic
premise of the probability-of-causation approach-that the populationbased data are precisely replicated in
each individual-"holds only if the
individual is truly representative of
the reference population. "41 The
analysis assumes, in the absence of
confounding, selection bias, or misclassification, that the background
rate of disease is the same for all nonexposed cohort members. 42 Given
unmeasured genetic and environmental factors, this assumption is
likely false. 43 The court-created rule
that any expert testimony offered in
support of causation be supported by
an epidemiological study with a
greater than two-fold magnitude of
association ignores this reality.
The reasoning employed by courts
in arriving at the two-fold risk
requirement also ignores an important complexity of disease process.
Individuals vary in their response to a
given disease determinant, depending on many factors. A substance
might, for example, have different
effects depending on the age of the
exposed individual. Depending on
how data are stratified, a study that
reveals no statistical association
between the exposure and the disease might misleadingly suggest that
there is no association, whereas it is
the complexity of the association that
is being misassessed.
Relying solely on the magnitude of
association to measure the actual
strength of the studied biological
relationship overlooks the fact that
the strength of a factor's effect on a
population depends on the relative
prevalence of its causal complements.44 Most diseases are thought to
be caused by multiple unrelated factors (or component causes), making
up, for lack of a better analogy, a
"causal pie." Additionally, there
might be many different causal pies
for one disease, each of which, when
all the component causes are present, is sufficient to lead to disease.
Whatever the biologic significance
of a particular "cause" of disease, if
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the other component causes that
make up the same sufficient causal
pie are rare, then the magnitude of
association for the particular "cause"
will be small. Given this, it is possible
that over a span of time, the magnitude of association between a particular cause and a particular disease
"may change because the prevalence
of its causal complements in various
mechanisms may also change." 45
There are several examples of
accepted causal relationships that have
a relatively weak strength of association, such as cigarette smoking and
cardiovascular disease or passive smoking and lung cancer, demonstrating
the relative value that strength of association plays in the scientific world. 46
Some courts, however, incorrectly
assume that a larger magnitude of
association always indicates a greater
likelihood of causal relationship-and
vice versa. This is a drastic and erroneous oversimplification.
Some courts will not admit expert
testimony if the expert has not published her views in a peer-reviewed
scientific journal. Another prevalent
legal misuse of epidemiology is the
insistence by some courts that experts
cannot testify if their opinions-or
the epidemiological analyses on
which they are based-have not been
subjected to the peer-review process.
Peer review and publication have
even been called the "most important
means of ensuring that an expert's
methodology is sound." 47
While on its face the peer-review
requirement may seem reasonable , it
is not reflective of the scientific
process of decision making. Publication in a peer-reviewed journal may
ensure that a particular study or
methodology receives attention, but

40. 953 S.W 2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997).
41. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra n. 32, at
807.
42. Robins & Greenland, Estimability and Estimation of Expected ¼ars of Life Lost Due to a Hazardous
Exposure, 10 STAT. MED. 79-93, at 80 (1991).
43. Id. at 81.

44. Rothman & Gree nland, MODERN EPIDEMIOL10-11 (Philadelphia, PA: Lippin cott-Raven,
1998).
45. Id. at 11.
46. Id. at 24.
47.Jones v. U.S., 933 F. Supp. 894,897 (N.D. Cal.
1996); see also Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 727.
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it is no guarantee that the study is
particularly reliable. Nor is the fact
that an opinion has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal evidence that the opinion lacks
scientific reliability. This is reflected
in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Daubert, which noted the fact that
some well-grounded theories will not
be published, and some theories or
techniques will be too new or of too
limited interest to be published. 48
In addition, scientists often disagree on the interpretation of each
other's data. One of the primary purposes for publication is to generate
debate and discussion in the scientific community. Not all of this debate
will take place in the pages of peerreviewed journals. Epidemiologists
do not refuse to consider other epidemiologists' views simply because
they are not published in peerreviewed journals. Nor should the
courts. To insist on peer-reviewed publication of an expert's views before
allowing a jury to consider the
expert's testimony is inappropriate
both because the "actual practice of
medicine" does not require it and
because "victims of a new toxic tort
should not be barred from having
their day in court simply because the
medical literature . . . has not yet
been completed." 49
Some courts require that expert
testimony be based only on studies
with results that meet an arbitrary
test of "statistical significance."
Another way in which courts misuse
48. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
49. Tumerv. lowaFireEquip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202,
1209 (8th Cir. 2000); H eller v. Shaw Indus., Inc.,
167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999).
50. Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1452.
51. Rothman & Greenland, supra n. 44.
52 Id. at 187.
53. Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 605 n. 25 (stating that "even if some sciences don't require [a
specific p-value] this Court does") .
54. Grant v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d
986, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000); Rue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435,
461 (M.D. N.C. 1998) ; LeBlanc v. Merrel/Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 782, 783 (E.D. La.
1996).
55. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 723.
56. Rothman & Greenland, supra n. 44, at 190.
57. Freiman, et al. , The Importance of Beta, the
Type II Error and Sample Size in the Design and Interpretation of the Randomized Control Trial: Survey of 71
"Negative" Trials. 299 N. ENGL. J. MED. 690-694
(1978).

epidemiology is in their treatment of
hypothesis testing, which is one way
for epidemiologists to estimate the
accuracy of an association between
exposure and disease revealed in a
study. Epidemiologists do so by measuring how likely it is that the same
result would have obtained had there
been no true association (i.e., if the
null hypothesis were true).
The "p-value" is the numerical
expression of this likelihood. Many
courts require that a study's results
have a p-value of less than 0.05 (i.e.,
that there is less than a 5 percent likelihood that the study's results would
have obtained had the null hypothesis been true) before allowing an
expert to rely on the study for an
admissible opinion. Misusing the language of science, these courts say
that, because this number must be
met to ensure "statistical significance," studies that fail to meet it simply cannot be considered. One
district court described a p-value of
less than 0.05 as " [ t] he most common
value used to establish significance
and to say that an observed association is probably real." 50
As epidemiologists know, however,
0.05 is an arbitrary number, with
more historical than inferential
value. 51 The division of study results
into "significant" and "non-significant" serves no purpose in causal
investigation other than to mislead.
Rather, use of bright-line rules in the
context of current scientific and judicial analysis "stems from the apparent
objectivity and definitiveness of the
pronouncement of significance" and
"can serve as a mechanical substitute
for thought, promulgated by the
inertia of training and common practice. "52 The selection of a certain level
of "significance" at which to test a
hypothesis involves a balance
between the number of false positives
and false negatives considered
acceptable. Using a higher p-value
(say, 0.10) will increase the number
of false positives, but decrease the
number of false negatives (although
there is not a one-to-one relationship
between the two). There is no
absolutely correct p-value from which
to choose, but judges are prone to

use 0.05 simply because they are told
that this is the standard for "statistical
significance." Indeed, some judges,
with the knowledge that overreliance
upon tests of statistical significance
has been criticized by scientists themselves, insist that " [ t] here must be
some objective way to put a value on
what the study says or shows." 53 If scientists and courts insist on "significance" testing, the actual p-value
should be reported and considered,
not simply whether it falls above or
below an arbitrary point.
Some courts misunderstand the
utility of a study's confidence interval
and exclude expert testimony based
on studies with an interval that
includes 1.0. Finally, some courts
state as a matter of law that if a confidence interval (usually performed at
the 95 percent level) includes the
value 1.0, then the study is not "statistically significant," and therefore is
not reliable. Many courts that take
this position cite the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Brock as support. 5' The
imposition of this legal requirement
flows from a misunderstanding of the
basic reason for using confidence
intervals. The Havner court stated
that a confidence interval "tells us if
the results of a given study are statistically significant at a particular confidence leveJ." 55 According to the
court, if the confidence interval
includes the number 1.0, then it is
not statistically significant, and hence
inconclusive.
This equivalence of the confidence
interval with hypothesis testing is precisely contrary to the purpose of providing a confidence interval. The
confidence interval is intended to
provide a range of values within
which, at a specified level of certainty,
the magnitude of association lies. 56
The confidence interval is not
another way to conduct hypothesis
testing. This point was brought home
by a reanalysis of 71 clinical trials that
relied on hypothesis testing to conclude that there was no relationship
between a proposed treatment and a
disease response, while the use of
confidence intervals revealed a moderate to strong effect of the treatment
being tested. 57
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A study in which the 95 percent
confidence interval includes the
value 1.0 (i. e., a relative risk in which
the incidence of disease is no greater
in those exposed to the putative
cause than in those unexposed) may
be statistically compatible with no
association, but could be overwhelmingly compatible with a strong association. Imagine two different studies.
One finds a relative risk of 1.8, with a
95 percent confidence interval
between 1.05 and 3.08. Another finds
a relative risk of 3.4, with a 95 percent
confidence interval between 0.95 and
12.17. It is true that, of these two
studies, it is less likely that the magnitude of association observed in the
first would have been observed had
there been no causal relationship
between the disease and the proposed causal factor. This does not
mean, however, that the observations
of the second study (or, for that matter, the first) offer no support for the
proposition that there is a causal relationship present. Simply put, when
judges only use confidence intervals
to determine whether 1.0 lies inside
or outside the interval, they are acting contrary to the scientific process
by abandoning the inferential value
of the confidence interval.

Results of misuse
Theoretically, one might look at the
examples of misuse described above
and conclude that, while unfortunate, disparate treatment of epidemiology in the scientific and legal
arenas should not raise the hackles of
judges, lawyers, scientists, or policy
makers. In reality, however, the barriers that judges have created to limit
the admissibility of expert testimony
have profound, one-sided consequences. In the short-term, the structural limitations on admissible
evidence mostly function to disfavor
plaintiffs seeking compensation for
injuries and assist companies seeking
to avoid liability (although there will
be some instances in which corporate
defendants will be disadvantaged by
these rules). In the long run, they
ensure that our system of justice will
be increasingly divorced from the
truth-and that there will be a declin20

ing respect for both science and law.
The short-term harm to plaintiffs is
due to several factors. First, plaintiffs
carry the burden of proof in civil
cases, and must show that a defendant's product or conduct caused
their injury by a preponderance of
the evidence. The rules described
above make proving causation more
difficult. This effect might be mitigated somewhat if the rules were
accompanied by their mirror images.
In other words, if an epidemiological
study reporting a relative risk of
greater than 2.0 was not only necessary to support expert testimony on
causation, but sufficient to prove causation, then the rule, though still irrational, would have a less inequitable
effect. We do not suggest, however,
that courts adopt such a rule .
By requiring the presentation of
epidemiological data to support testimony on causation, courts also effectively disfavor injured plaintiffs
because of unequal access to
resources. Injured plaintiffs normally
do not have sufficient funds to support epidemiologic research related
to their legal claims, and federal
funding of large-scale epidemiological studies has decreased along with
funding of scientific research in general. In contrast, most defendants in
mass toxic tort cases have sufficient
funds to choose which relationships
to study, how to study them, and
whether to publicize the results.
Some courts have recognized this
problem. 58
Finally, there are short-term effects
on injured plaintiffs because of the
varying interests of repeat and nonrepeat players in the justice system.
Most plaintiffs have no interest in
funding a long-term epidemiological
study that may have no impact on
their particular case, or may take too
long to have an impact. Corporations, with the expectation of being
sued multiple times, have a greater
incentive to fund epidemiological
studies, and to publish those that are
favorable to their defense.
The long-term effect of the misguided restrictions on evidence
described in this article is simple. As
more and more relevant evidence is
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excluded, the outcomes in court
cases will become less and less consistent with the truth . This, we fear, will
concomitantly lead to decreased
respect by the public for science and
for the law.

Causes of legal misuse
In our view, there are several reasons
why the law continues to misuse epidemiology. First, some of the misuse
stems from the unfamiliarity of many
judges with the scientific process.
Miscommunication and misunderstanding inevitably lead to misuse.
A second explanation is the desire
of judges to impose bright-line rules,
such as requiring an epidemiological
study to demonstrate a two-fold magnitude of association, a p-value of less
than 0.05, or a confidence interval
that does not include unity. Judges,
seeking certainty where scientists are
unwilling to impose it, may apply
these rules to make decisions easier,
and give an air of scientific "objectivity" to their rulings.
Third, there may be a fear (explicitly articulated in some of the Bendectin cases) that ''.junk science," in
combination with dramatic testimony
from injured plaintiffs, will work a
pernicious influence on gullible
juries. If this fear is truly justified,
however, then the jury system should
be improved. The evidentiary rules
should not be rigged so that scientific
studies are given more or less weight
in the courtroom than scientists
would give them, depending upon
what is necessary to keep the case
from the jury.
A fourth factor contributing to
legal misuse of epidemiology is a
combination of judicial hubris and
susceptibility.Judges are called upon,
every day, to master unfamiliar subjects and to make major decisions
affecting others' lives. They do so,
moreover, in an adversarial context,
where they are understandably suspicious of all of the participants'
motives. Ultimately, even without any
scientific training, some judges come
58. Bonner v. ISP Technologies, Inc., 259 F. 3d 924,
928-930 (8th Cir. 2001 ); Mar<kr, 630 F. Supp. at
1094.

to believe that they are better
equipped than scientists (or at least
the scientists before them) to determine what is and is not valid scientific
methodology.
An even more basic reason these
rules have been adopted is that their
substantive results are d esired by
those who benefit from them the
most-potential corporate defendants seeking to minimize their liability and maximize their profits. In
saying this, we are not ascribing any
pernicious motives to these companies. They are doing exactly what one
would expect profit-maximizing institutions in our economy to do-trying
to get the legal rules (and judges'
interpretations of them) changed to
their benefit. While demonstrating
this fact is well beyond the scope of
this article, we will provide one anecdote that reflects the means by which
some companies, and their supporters, further their goals.
Recently, America's largest corporations helped launch a massive campaign to convince policy makers that
''.junk science" was an enormous
threat to our system of justice-and
that the legal rules had to be changed
to prevent it. The centerpiece of the
campaign was a book written by Peter
Huber, detailing fantastical claims of
the willingness of judges and juries to
rely on the "far fringes of science" to
assess liability. 59 Huber described
juries (and some judges) running
amok, awarding damages to plaintiffs
who brought "frivolous" claims based
on questionable scientific evidence.
The book was cited by several courts,
including the Ninth Circuit in its
Daubert decision, and undoubtedly
played a key role in persuading some
judges that changes in the legal rules
governing the admissibility of scientific evidence were needed. Much of
Huber's book, however, was blatantly
unreliable. 60 Huber's ideas appear to
59. Huber, GALILEO'S REVENCE:JUNK SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM (New York, NY: Basic Books,
1991).
60. Chesebro, Galileo's &tort: Peter Huber 's junk
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637-1726 (1993).
61. Id. at 1707-1722.
62. Information about the Association's project
can be found at http://www.aaas.org/ spp/ case/
case.

have gained success primarily due to
the efforts of the Manhattan Institute
for Policy Research, a conservative
think tank, to promote the ideas of
people like Huber and others who
would raise barriers to a plaintiffs
ability to successfully bring suit
against a corporation. 61

Suggestions for action
We propose several possible ways to
improve the law's use of science in
evaluating causal relationships. First,
to the extent that legal misuse of epidemiology is caused by misunderstanding or miscommunication, both
the scientific and legal communities
have to do more to educate judges
about science. Second, there are procedures for judges to appoint experts
for the court, not to take sides, but,
rather, to ensure that the judge, and
in some cases the jury, understands
the relevant scientific principles in a
case. The American Association for
the Advancement of Sciences has
launched a program to help federal
judges identify potentially-helpful
court-appointed experts-it became
fully operational two years ago and
since that time has assisted federal
judges in identifying experts in fields
ranging from engineering to econometrics to epidemiology. 62
Third, the scientific community
needs to provide feedback to the
legal community in general, and
judges in particular, about whether
science is being used correctly. The
simplest way for scientists to do this is
to inform judges and litigants directly
when they learn of a lawsuit or legal
decision in which science is being
misused. Scientists also should publish articles, in legal as well as scientific media, expressing their concerns
and correcting the errors they have
found. In our experience, most
judges are surprisingly responsive to
this feedback; they want to use science correctly. The most formal, and
most effective, means to provide such
feedback is for scientists to file amicus
curiae briefs. Amicus briefs, filed
either while a decision is under
reconsideration or in advance of an
appellate argument regarding an
important scientific question, are

essential for informing judges how to
use scientific principles correctly.
Scientific organizations and educational institutions also should promote educational programs to bring
scientists, lawyers, and judges
together. Many judges are particularly eager to learn from experts who
are not active participants in the
adversarial dispute before them. Scientific organizations also should
work with legal institutions to establish more formal feedback processes
and enhance legal understanding of
science. The Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial
Center, the National Center for State
Courts, and the NationalJudicial College all should be interested in developing such processes.
Finally, increased funding of scientific research also will help law use science to find the truth. Neither law
nor science is likely to discover the
truth if scientific research is funded
primarily by those who have a strong
financial interest in a particular outcome. Admittedly, government itself
has an incentive in preserving longheld government positions (such as
those related to health effects of lowdose radiation), but increased government funding is part of a means
to ensure that science and law both
have a better chance to do what we
want them to do-help us discover
the truth. iii

ARTHUR H. BRYANT
is the Executive Director of Trial
Lawyers for Public Justice,
a national public interest law firm
with offices in Washington, DC.
and Oakland, CA (abryant@tlpj.org).

ALEXANDER A. REINERT
is an Associate at Koob &
Magoolaghan, a civil rights law
firm located in New York City.
(aar@kmlaw-ny.com).

www.ajs.org JUDICATURE

21

